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FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAWS - EXCLUSIVE DEALING - STANDARDS
OF ILLEGALITY UNDER SECTION 3 OF THE CLAYTON AcT-In a re-

cent treatment of exclusive dealing arrangements, Tampa Elec.
Co. v. Nashville Coal Co.,1 the Supreme Court enunciates with
some care the standards to be applied in judging the legality of
requirements contracts under section 3 of the Clayton Act. 2 This

1365 U.S. 820 (1961).
2 88 Stat. 781 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1958).
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comment analyzes the merits and the impact of this needed clarification of a controversial area of antitn1st law.
Exclusive marketing arrangements manifest themselves in various forms, and it is not uncommon to find more than one variety
in a given contract. This inquiry, however, will be restricted
largely to full requirements contracts, obligating a buyer to purchase from a seller all that he may require of the latter's product
for a specified period of time, and to other exclusive dealing agreements the intended effect of which is to preclude the buyer
from dealing in merchandise that competes with the seller's
product.

I.
Because in its judgment the applicable provisions of the Sherman Act,8 like the common law doctrines preceding them,4 failed
to curb the injurious effects upon competition of some exclusive
dealing arrangements, Congress in 1914 enacted section 3 of the
Clayton Act. That section forbids certain transactions which incorporate a buyer's or lessee's agreement not to use or deal in the
commodities of the seller's or lessor's competitors, but only where
the effect thereof "may be to substantially lessen competition or
tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce."5 This qualifying clause has been the source of most of the interpretative difficulties attending application of the statute.
In an early case, Standard Fashion Co. v. Magrane-Houston
Co.,6 the Supreme Court found section 3 to have been violated
by exclusive dealing contracts between a manufacturer of standard
garment patterns and its dealers where the manufacturer or its
holding company controlled about forty percent of the 52,000
pattern agencies in the United States. While the Court did place
some emphasis upon the manner in which such contracts could
be used to deny competitors access to the retail market,7 it also
a 26 Stat. 209 (1890), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ I, 2 (1958).
~ At common law, a bargain to deal exclusively with another was illegal if it effected,
or formed part of a plan to effect, a monopoly. If reasonably ancillary to a main lawful
purpose, it escaped censure. See 2 REsTATEMENT, CoNTRAcrs §§ 514, 516 (e) (1932).
r; This phrase was inserted "because of an apparent realization that some legitimate
business considerations might justify certain forms of exclusive dealing.•••" Arr'Y GEN.
NAT'L COMM. ANTITRUsr REP. 138 (1955).
6 258 U.S. 346 (1922). Compare Fashion Originators' Guild of America v. FTC, 312
U.S. 457 (1941).
7 The Court quoted with approval from the opinion of the court below: "'The
restriction of each merchant to one pattern manufacturer must in hundreds, perhaps in
thousands, of small communities amount to giving such single pattern manufacturer a
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implied that the inference of lessened competition or tendency
toward monopoly was supportable by a bare finding that the seller
in question dominated the market.8 The Standard Fashion opinion thus created issues which have characterized this area ever
since. What is the required scope of market analysis? Is denial of
market access a necessary concomitant of the parties' observance
of exclusive dealing contracts? Does the use of such contracts by
a seller in a dominant market position automatically produce a
section 3 violation?
The issue of prime importance, to which these questions are all
related, has been, and probably will continue to be, the standard
of proof to be applied. In early court cases, and generally in Federal Trade Commission proceedings, there exists a willingness to
judge exclusive dealing contracts on a comparative standard permitting the substantiality of a denial of market access to be weighed
in terms of its relation to the pattern of competition in the line of
commerce involved.9 More recently, however, the standards of
analysis tend to reflect the influence of the quantitative test established for "tying" contracts by International Salt Co. v. United
States.10 There it was held that coverage by patent tying clauses
of a not insignificant volume of commerce was sufficient basis from
which to infer a lessening of competition or tendency toward
monopoly.
But the economic realities which perhaps dictate the appropriateness of this "quantitative substantiality" test11 for tying conmonopoly of the business in such community. Even in the larger cities, to limit to a
single pattern maker the pattern business of dealers most resorted to by customers whose
purchases tend to give fashions their vogue, may tend to facilitate further combinations;
so that the plaintiff, or some other aggressive concern, instead of controlling two-fifths,
will shortly have almost, if not quite, all the pattern business.'" 258 U.S. at 357.
s But see HANDLER, ANTITRUST IN PERSPECTIVE 32-33 (1957): "Under this reading, per
se invalidity would attach to the use of exclusives by any dominant seller.••• [But],
as a matter of authority, the case in no wise holds that the existence of dominant power
automatically results in a Section 3 violation.''
9 E.g., Pick Mfg. Co. v. General Motors Corp., 80 F.2d 641 (7th Cir. 1935), afj'd per
curiam, 299 U.S. 3 (1936); United States v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 83 F. Supp. 978 (N.D.
Ill. 1949); Revlon Prods. Corp., 51 F.T.C. 260 (1954); Maico Co., 50 F.T.C. 485 (1954). The
FTC has jurisdiction in § 3 cases by virtue of § 11 of the Clayton Act, 64 Stat. 1126 (1950),
as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 21 (Supp. II, 1960).
10 332 U.S. 392 (1947). Leases of patented machines on condition that lessees purchase
from lessor all unpatented salt consumed in them were held on summary judgment to be
a violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act and § 3 of the Clayton Act. For sample definitions
of tying and exclusive contracts, see Judson L. Thomson Mfg. Co. v. FTC, 150 F.2d 952
(1st Cir.), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 776 (1945).
llThis term denotes a standard of illegality which depends solely upon the amount
of goods or dollar volume involved, considered in absolute terms. This test should be
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tracts are not necessarily characteristic of other types of exclusive
dealing agreements. While most tying contracts are justifiably
thought to be inherently anticompetitive in nature, since they
"serve hardly any purpose beyond the suppression of competition,"12 other exclusive arrangements, and especially requirements
contracts, can promote as well as restrain competition.13 Therefore, while a finding of great market leverage or of coverage of a
substantial amount of business may entitle a court to take the
experientially-justified shortcut to the conclusion that a tying contract will necessarily lessen competition or tend toward monopoly,
such simplicity of inference is generally ill-suited to other types of
exclusive dealing agreements. The fact that exclusive sales contracts can at times be consistent with antitrust objectives indicates
that further analysis of market structure and behavior will usually
be necessary. Yet Standard Oil Co. v. United States,1 4 heretofore
the most important application of section 3 to requirements contracts, lends some support to use of the quantitative approach.

II.
At issue in the Standard Stations case were approximately 8,000
exclusive contracts between Standard and 5,937 independent retail
outlets, by the terms of which the retailers agreed to take from
Standard all their requirements of one or more products, chiefly
gasoline, either for a specified term or from year to year. The
contracts covered 16 percent of the independent outlets in the
relevant market area, comprised of seven western states, and indistinguished from the "substantial share of commerce" test which is based upon the proportion of the market which the amount of commerce in question bears to the market as
a whole. Compare International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947), with
Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293 (1949). See 49 CoLUM. L. REv. 241 (1949).
Since the Standard Stations decision, exclusive dealing controversy has often taken the form
of "quantitative substantiality versus rule of reason inquiry," with the understanding that
these terms signify general approaches rather than technical niceties. However, the same
generality that makes these phrases convenient only serves to introduce confusion into any
attempt to distinguish among their more limited applications. See note 17 infra and text
accompanying note 18 infra.
12 Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 305-06 (1949); accord, Black v.
Magnolia Liquor Co., 355 U.S. 24 (1957).
13 Exclusive arrangements can bolster weak competitors and facilitate entry into the
market. For parties to requirements contracts, positive values include enhanced certainty
and ability to plan in a fluctuating market, lower costs, and assured supply. See KAYSEN 8:
TURNER, ANTITRusr POLICY, AN EcONO!IUC AND LEGAL ANALYSIS 159 (1959); Stockhausen,
The Commercial and Antitrust Aspects of Term Requirements Contracts, 23 N.Y.U.L.
R.Ev. 412 (1948).
14 337 U.S. 293 (1949) [hereinafter referred to as Standard Stations].
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volved the purchase of more than $57,600,000 worth of gasoline,
or 6. 7 percent of the total gallonage in that area, as well as 2 percent of tire and battery sales. While not as a matter of law in a
position of dominance, Standard was nevertheless the market leader; its total gasoline sales in 1946 constituted 23 percent of the
taxable gallonage in the western area. Standard's six leading competitors, who also utilized exclusive dealing arrangements, absorbed 42.5 percent of the total taxable gallonage, and the remainder was divided among more than seventy small companies.
The district court expressly declined to hold the contracts
illegal per se, and allowed many comparative statistics to go into
the record as relevant to the determination of unreasonableness of
restraint under the Sherman Act and substantiality of restraint or
tendency to create monopoly under the Clayton Act. However,
the court held that "substantiality of restraint or tendency to create
monopoly is established by (a) the market foreclosed, -here represented by the controlled units, - and (b) the volume of controlled business" and that "there is illegal restraint here under
both Acts, whether the commerce be considered quantitatively or
comparatively. "Hi
The issue before the Supreme Court, as framed by Mr. Justice
Frankfurter, was whether the qualifying clause of section 3 could
be satisfied simply by proof that the requirements contracts affected
a substantial portion of commerce or whether it was necessary to
show that competitive activity did or probably would diminish.
The Court held "that the qualifying clause of § 3 is satisfied by
proof that competition has been foreclosed in a substantial share
of the line of commerce affected." 16 In so concluding, the Court
appears to have rejected the applicability of the quantitative substaptiality test. Mr. Justice Frankfurter explicitly refused to regard
the International Salt decision as dispositive of the case because
of the economic differences between tying and requirements contracts which make the latter less obviously detrimental to competition and render quantitative substantiality alone a weaker foundation for the inference that competition may be lessened by
requirements contracts.17 To accept this distinction, the Justice
15 United

States v. Standard Oil Co., 78 F. Supp. 850, 872 (S.D. Cal. 1948), aff'd, 337

U.S. 293 (1949).
16 337
17 See

U.S. at 314.
note 13 supra. In general, tying clauses are unreasonable per se under the
Sherman Act whenever the defendant has sufficient market power in the tying product
to restrain competition appreciably for the tied product and·a "not insubstantial" amount
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continued, is to make relevant further economic tests, toward
which some of Standard's evidence was addressed. The implication seems to be that in a normal case direct proof of actual or
probable diminution of competition would be necessary to find a
section 3 violation, and that the cases must be considered with
regard to the particular market settings involved. On the other
hand, it is clear that the Court, in section 3 cases, will not indulge
in that broad market analysis appropriate to most Sherman Act
trade restraint cases.18 "It seems hardly likely that, having with
one hand set up an express prohibition against a practice thought
to be beyond the reach of the Sherman Act, Congress meant, with
the other hand, to reestablish the necessity of meeting the same
tests of detriment to the public interest as that act had been interpreted as requiring.''19
For the cause before him, Mr. Justice Frankfurter appears to
have settled upon a standard of proof requiring less market analysis
than that contended for by Standard and more than that used by
the court below. In his judgment, the circumstances of the case
relieved the Court of any obligation to consider Standard's evidence pertaining to actual increase or decrease in the number of
its competitors and their dealers because, even granting the comparison sought to be established, a court would be unable to conclude with certainty whether competition had or probably would
be substantially lessened as a result of the contracts. Two factors
of commerce is affected. Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958). The
presence of either of the above factors will render a tying clause illegal under § 3 of the
Clayton Act. And if the clause transgresses either under the Sherman Act or the Clayton
Act, it is a violation of § 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 38 Stat. 719 (1914), as
amended, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (a) (1958). See Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States,
!145 U.S. 594, 608 (1953); United States v. American Linen Supply Co., 141 F. Supp. 105,
112 (N.D. Ill. 1956). The requisite market power can be inferred from sales leadership
or even from the desirability of the tying product to the buyer. United States v. Jerrold
Electronics Corp., 187 F. Supp. 545 (E.D. Pa. 1960), aff'd per curiam, 365 U.S. 567 (1961),
Note, 70 YALE L.J. 804 (1961).
18 In deciding whether a restraint of trade is unreasonable under § 1 of the Sherman
Act, "the court must ordinarily consider the facts peculiar to the business to which the
restraint is applied; its condition before and after the restraint was imposed; the nature
of the restraint and its effect, actual or probable. The history of the restraint, the evil
believed to exist, the reason for adopting the particular remedy, the purpose or end
sought to be obtained, are all relevant facts." Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246
U.S. 231, 238 (1918) (per Mr. Justice Brandeis). Accord, United States v. Columbia Steel
Co., 334 U.S. 495, 5Zl (1948).
10 Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 312 (1949). See Antitrust Law
Symposium, 1959 N.Y.S.B.A. SECTION ON ANTITRUST I.Aw 105 n.105, to the effect that
factors properly considered under § I of the Sherman Act are also relevant to the question whether an incipient violation exists under § 3 of the Clayton Act.
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were emphasized in justification of this view. First, exclusive dealing was an industry practice, and may have enabled the major suppliers at least to maintain shares of the market which would otherwise have been smaller. Second, other marketing devices, equally
capable of restricting competition, were readily available to these
suppliers. Agency contracts and vertical integration were obvious
alternatives. Hence the standard of proof for which Standard
argued was virtually impossible to meet, directed as it was toward
what might have happened or what would happen to the market
but for the contracts in issue.
It seems a fair interpretation to say that the Court felt, not
that it was ill-equipped to undertake extensive market analysis,20
or even that such analysis was inappropriate in the usual section 3
case, but rather that it would prove futile in this particular litigation. Ordinarily, such a finding would necessitate holding that
the Government had not met its burden of proof, for it is a long
step from the proposition that Standard could not show that competition was not lessened to the conclusion that an actual or probable lessening of competition had been established. Yet this conclusion was nevertheless drawn. It is the nature of this more limited
standard of proof and the factors which will trigger its invocation
with which this comment is concerned.
In holding against Standard, the Court apparently found factual justification in the substantiality of the amounts comprehended, the number of retail outlets involved, the percentage of
the relevant market covered by the contracts, Standard's position
as the sales leader, the fact that its largest competitors also engaged
in exclusive dealing, and its great bargaining power relative to the
retailers with whom it dealt. 21 If, as the Standard Fashion case
20 Although the opinion states that the test offered by Standard Oil "would be a
standard of proof, if not virtually impossible to meet, at least most ill-suited for ascertainment by courts," 337 U.S. at 310, it is not likely that the Court would profess a loss,
in § 3 cases, of that ability which it so obviously exercises under the Sherman Act. A
reasonable explanation would appear to be that the Court viewed Standard's argument as
one which would not be meritorious under either act, in view of the circumstances of the
case. The possible validity of the alternative interpretation -that Mr. Justice Frankfurter
employed a fallacious argument to preclude the use of extended market analysis in ~ 3
cases - must be admitted. However, it is possible to reconcile his position with subsequent
and less stringent pronouncements of the Court, which lend hindsight support to the
more charitable view, and that is attempted here. But see Oppenheim, Federal Antitrust
Legislation: Guideposts to a Revised National Antitrust Policy, 50 MICH. L. REv. 1139,
1162 (1952).
21 Mr. Justice Frankfurter's attention to market structure and competitive patterns
may have been more extensive than it initially appeared. See his dissenting opinion in
FTC v. Motion Picture Advertising Serv. Co., 344 U.S. 392, 401-02 (1953), where Standard
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may be said to have held, dominance coupled with exclusive coverage of a substantial share of commerce is sufficient ground for
inferring a lessening of competition, it extends the principle but
little to say that Standard's status, because of the peculiar pattern
of competition in this market, was the legal equivalent of market
dominance. While the inevitability of the result escapes many,
the Court has apparently subscribed to the view that there is a
connection between great market power and the likelihood of
foreclosure of competitive activity which obviates the necessity of
making an extended market analysis when a substantial22 share
of the relevant market has been tied up through exclusive dealing
agreements. This emphasis in Standard Stations led courts in a
number of cases thereafter decided to proclaim a per se rule in
applying the statute.23
Apparently "foreclosure" is thought to be an inevitable result
of the mere observance of the contracts by the parties to them,
since adherence by a buyer automatically removes him for the
length of the contract from the group of such buyers to whom
competitors of the supplier may sell. But whether foreclosure of
competition is an actual or likely result of contract observance
should depend entirely upon what market is considered relevant.24
If, as was held in Standard Stations, the arena of competition
among suppliers is the independent retail dealer market, contracts
Stations was discussed in terms of such factors as public interest, the bargaining power of
the seller vis-a-vis the retailer, and the importance of the relevant product to the retailer's
total business.
22 The percentage must be more than de minimis, but, in view of the 2% and 6.7%
figures found in Standard Stations, it need not be great. It should be noted that the
statute is aimed at the probability, not the mere possibility, that competition will be
substantially lessened. Compare B. S. Pearsall Butter Co. v. FTC, 292 Fed. 720 (7th Cir.
1923) (1% coverage not a violation). There is, of course, the possibility that the Court
will lower its standard of substantiality as other restrictive elements appear. This would
be in keeping with the objective of reaching incipient violations.
23Anchor Serum Co. v. FTC, 217 F.2d 867 (7th Cir. 1954) (dictum); Dictograph
Prods., Inc. v. FTC, 217 F.2d 821 (2d Cir. 1954) (dictum), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 940
(1955); United States v. Richfield Oil Corp., 99 F. Supp. 280 (S.D. Cal. 1951), afj'd per
curiam, 343 U.S. 922 (1952) (on basis of Standard Stations). Compare Signode Steel
Strapping Co. v. FTC, 132 F.2d 48 (4th Cir. 1942); Oxford Varnish Corp. v. Ault &:
Wiborg Corp., 83 F.2d 764 (6th Cir. 1936). Cf. Transamerica Corp. v. Board of Governors,
206 F.2d 163 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 901 (1953).
24 Some criticism has been leveled at the majority in Standard Stations for failing to
consider alternative marketing channels. E.g., HANDLER, ANTITRUST IN PERSPECTIVE 36
(1957). Compare Lockhart &: Sacks, The Relevance of Economic Factors in Determining
Whether Exclusive Arrangements Violate Section 3 of the Clayton Act, 65 HARV. L. REv.
913, 919, 935 (1952). Such criticism appears to involve the prejudgment that the area of
effective competition was some market other than the one found by the Court to be
relevant. See Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 299-300, 300 n.5 (1949).
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with a certain percentage of the dealers handling a certain share of
commerce in a particular commodity25 ,;\Till deny to competitors
of the contracting supplier access to that much of the relevant
market. To that extent the opportunity of suppliers to compete
for the business of the retailers is foreclosed. Even if the competitors develop new markets, competition for the pre-empted share
,;\Till have been suppressed, and if that share is substantial, section
3 may be said to have been violated. On the other hand, if the
Court in Standard Stations had found that competition among the
suppliers was in actuality for the purchase dollars of automobile
owners, and that the retailers were "only a conduit from the oil
fields to the driver's tank, a means by which the oil companies
compete to get the business of the ultimate consumer" and "the
instrumentalities through which competition for this ultimate
market is waged," 26 exclusive contracts binding a certain share of
the retail dealers would not necessarily result in a lessening of
competition. At least that conclusion could not be drawn without
further analysis of the actual or probable effects of the contracts,
for at the making of the contracts the ultimate consumers will not
yet have committed themselves to buy from particular retailers.
As will appear, Tampa Electric does not suggest a diminution
of the Court's hostility toward dominant users' employment of
exclusive dealing contracts. Rather, it clarifies by indirection such
cases as Standard Stations while underlining the necessity for more
extensive market analysis where the exclusive dealing supplier does
but a small share of the business in the relevant market.

III.
The Tampa Electric case presented for the Court's consideration a requirements contract by which defendant coal company
agreed to sell to plaintiff, a Florida utility company, substantially all the coal which the latter would require to operate the
first two units of a new generating station for a period of twenty
25 In

a § 3 case, the court must determine the relevant market area. Tampa Elec.
Cf. United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 332
U.S. 218, 226 (1947). Also of importance is the determination of the relevant product or
line of commerce. Whether substitute products will be included may depend upon "crosselasticity of demand." Compare United States v. E. I. duPont de Nemours &: Co., 351 U.S.
377 (1956), with International Boxing Club v. United States, 358 U.S. 242, 249-50 (1959),
and Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 612 n.31 (1953).
26 Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 323 (1949) (dissenting opinion of
Mr. Justice Jackson).
Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S. 320 (1961).
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years. Before any coal was delivered, defendant advised plaintiff
that it would not perform since it regarded the contract as illegal
under the antitrust laws. In plaintiff's action to have the contract
declared valid, the district court27 granted the coal company's motion for summary judgment on the ground that the undisputed
facts showed a substantial lessening of competition in violation of
section 3 of the Clayton Act. Primary emphasis was placed upon
the fact that the estimated coal tonnage, competition for which was
foreclosed by the contract, exceeded the previous annual consumption of all of peninsular Florida, and also upon the fact that the
contract value of the coal covered by the twenty-year term $128,000,000 - was not "insignificant or insubstantial."
In an opinion by Mr. Justice Clark, Justices Black and Douglas
dissenting, the Supreme Court reversed, holding that the courts
below had not properly considered the controlling factor of "relevant market." The relevant market, said Mr. Justice Clark, was
the area of effective competition between defendant and the other
700 coal producers to whom Tampa Electric could have turned for
its supply. The Court concluded from its consideration of certain
statistics that even with pre-emption to the extent of maximum
anticipated total requirements, Tampa Electric's share of the relevant coal product would be less than one percent. Noting that dollar
volume alone is not the proper test, the Court held that pre-emption of competition to the extent of the tonnage involved did not
tend to foreclose competition substantially. The supplier's market
position was not inherently anticompetitive, as was the case in
Standard Fashion, Standard Stations and International Salt, and
only a small share of the relevant market was affected. Also stressed
were the mutually advantageous nature of the contract and the
public interest in the availability to a utility company of an assured
and ample fuel supply.
In the course of his opinion Mr. Justice Clark took advantage
of the opportunity to elaborate upon the tests to be applied in
cases such as the one before him. As threshold questions, he
noted, a court must determine whether the contract involved is
in fact an exclusive dealing arrangement; what line of commerce
is involved; and the relevant market area. In order to hold section
3 violated, the court must further find (1) that there has been or
27168 F. Supp. 456 (D.C. Tenn. 1958), afj'd, 276 F.2d 766 (6th Cir. 1960), 46 VA. L.
REv. 1463 (1960), 60 CoLuM. L. REv. 1188 (1960).
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probably will be a "foreclosure of competition" - presumably consisting of denial of market access; (2) that such foreclosure occurs
in the relevant market area; and (3) that the competition foreclosed constitutes a substantial share of the relevant market.
Perhaps the most important feature of the opinion is its emphasis upon market analysis and the necessity for weighing various
factors in their competitive setting before arriving at a decision
in a given case. It is the Court's position that in determining
whether there is or probably will be a substantial foreclosure of
competition such as will violate section 3, the probable effect of
the contract upon the relevant market should be weighed. Consideration should be given to: (I) the relative strength of the
parties to the contract; (2) the duration of the contract, including
such particularized considerations of the businesses involved as
may be relevant thereto; 28 (3) the percentage of commerce in the
relevant market that is involved; and (4) the probable effects, both
immediate and future, of a pre-emption of that percentage upon
effective competition in the relevant market.
While undertaking its first notable elaboration of the foreclosure concept, however, the Court leaves several questions in
need of clarification. Among these is the weight to be assigned to
a determination of the relative strength of the contracting parties.
While legislative history gives some indication that section 3 was
intended to mitigate the coercive effects of an inequality of bargaining power between the contracting parties,29 it is arguable that the
28 Considerations of motive should be distinguished, since they are irrelevant in a
3 case. See ATT'Y GEN. NAT'L COMM. ANTITRUST REP. 148 (1955); DIRLAM & KAHN, FAIR
COMPETITION: THE LAw AND ECONOMICS OF ANTITRUST POLICY 45 (1954). Under § 3,
the weight of "particularized considerations of the parties' operations" is far less than
under the Sherman Act, or under § 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, where "the
point where a method of competition becomes 'unfair' ••• will often turn on the exigen•
cies of a particular situation, trade practices, or the practical requirements of the business
in question.'' FTC v. Motion Picture Advertising Serv. Co., 344 U.S. 392, 396 (1953)
(per Mr. Justice Douglas).
29E.g., H.R. REP. No. 627, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. 10-13 (1914); 51 CONG. REc. 9072, 9083,
9160-61, 9407-08, 14270 (1914). See Beloit Culligan Soft Water Serv., Inc. v. Culligan,
Inc., 274 F.2d 29, 35 (7th Cir. 1959); Maico Co., 51 F.T.C. 1197, 1205 (1955) (dissenting
opinion of Commissioner Mead). But see Reliable Volkswagen Sales & Serv. Co. v. WorldWide Auto Corp., 182 F. Supp. 412, 423 (D.N.J. 1960). It has been held that the plain
language of § 3 precludes resort to legislative history for its interpretation. Standard
Fashion Co. v. Magrane-Houston Co., 258 U.S. 346 (1922); Anchor Serum Co. v. ITC, 217
F.2d 867 (7th Cir. 1954). That language clearly permits coercion to be considered in
determining whether an exclusive dealing arrangement has in fact been made, but
whether § 3's protection embraces the competitive opportunities of the buyer or lessee is
not clear. If the buyer's ability to compete, presumably in a different relevant market,
is somehow impaired by his exclusive contract with the supplier, coercion might become
relevant, although still not controlling. However, this is a different issue entirely, and it
should be treated separately in the cases, if at all.

§
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language of the statute protects competitors of the seller or lessor
while preserving only indirectly the exercise of independent choice
by customers. If this interpretation is correct, then neither the
result nor the nature of the standard of proof should be determined by the presence or absence of coercive elements in the
contract relationship, for the buyer or lessee surrenders his right
to choose among competing suppliers for the contract's duration
whether or not he has been forced to accede to the exclusive dealing provision. In this sense, at least, relative bargaining power
of the contracting parties is irrelevant to the issue of foreclosure
of competition.
On the other hand, concentration of economic power in a
supplier vis-a-vis competing suppliers may have some bearing on
the foreclosure question, since in the absence of direct evidence
to the contrary, and barring unusual patterns of competition, it
points to the increased probability that the supplier's exclusive
dealing agreements will lessen competition or tend toward monopoly. Yet the Court, while reaffirming the vitality of Standard
Fashion and Standard Stations, has once again provided a minimum of enlightenment upon the relationship between dominant
market power and the standard of proof needed to satisfy section
3's qualifying clause. Mr. Justice Clark states the teaching of the
Standard Fashion case and United Shoe Mach. Corp. v. United
States3° to be "that a finding of domination of the relevant market
by the lessor or seller was sufficient to support the inference that
competition had or would be substantially lessened by the contracts involved there," but observes that some heed was given to
"the practical effect" of the contracts.31 Similarly, he interprets
Standard Stations as holding that requirements contracts "are
proscribed by § 3 if their practical effect is to prevent lessees or
purchasers from dealing in the goods, etc., of a competitor or competitors of the lessor or seller and thereby 'competition has been
foreclosed in a substantial share of the line of commerce affected.' "
Later, however, he states that the combination of the large number of gasoline stations, the large number of contracts and the great
volume of products involved "dictated a finding that 'Standard's
use of the contracts [created] just such a potential clog on competition as it was the purpose of § 3 to remove' where, as there,
30 258
31 !165

U.S. 451 (1922).
U.S. at !126.
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the affected proportion of retail sales was substantial."32 Doubt
thus remains to cloud the evidentiary issue.
But in carefully distinguishing the Tampa Electric contract
from those made by suppliers wielding disproportionate market
power, the Court further elucidates its position on this issue and
offers a clue to the proper reading of Standard Stations: 33
"There is here neither a seller ·with a dominant position
in the market as in Standard Fashions . .. nor myriad outlets
with substantial sales volume, coupled with an industry-wide
practice of relying upon exclusive contracts, as in Standard
Oil . .. nor a plainly restrictive tying arrangement as in International Salt. . . . On the contrary, we seem to have only
that type of contract which "may well be of economic advantage to buyers as well as to sellers."34
The flavor of the opinion taken as a whole suggests the conclusion that the Court will enlarge or restrict the scope of the
standard of proof. from case to case, depending upon the presence
or absence of certain evidentiary factors. Where the supplier
occupies a position of market dominance or its equivalent, a holding of illegality may be predicated upon proof that a substantial
percentage of the relevant market in the line of commerce involved
has been pre-empted by exclusive dealing arrangements. Where
the supplier does not have such market control, no violation of
section 3 will be found in the absence of further evidence showing
actual or probable substantial diminution of competition in the
relevant market for the line of commerce involved.
The division between these varying applications of the statutory standard may in actuality be less sharply-defined, however.
Something less than dominant market power is likely to be its
equivalent in legal effect. In the light of Standard Stations, this
category will no doubt include leadership of a dominant group of
suppliers, the other members of which also deal exclusively. The
inclusion seems appropriate, for the potential detriment to small
32 Id. at 329. (Emphasis added.) Mr. Justice Frankfurter's silent participation in the
majority opinion should be noted.
33 For various interpretations of the Standard Stations case, see KAYSEN &: TURNER,
op. cit. supra note 13, at 147, 160; HANDLER, op. cit. supra note 24, at 33-37; DIRLAM &:
KAHN, op. cit. supra note 28, at 93-94, 100; McLaren, Related Problems of "Requirements"
Contracts and Acquisitions in Vertical Integration Under the Anti-Trust Laws, 45 ILL. L.
REv. 141, 161-65 (1950); Schwartz, Potential Impairment of Competition -Impact of
Standard Oil Co. of California v. United States on Standard of Legality Under Clayton
Act, 98 U. PA. L. REv. IO (1949).
34 365 U.S. at 334.
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competitors is substantially similar whether one firm or a handful
employ the restrictive devices. Even here, evidentiary considerations might vary, depending upon the number of the major suppliers using exclusive dealing contracts, although conservative
counseling will point out the high antitrust risk attending any
major's extensive use of such practices.
An exception to the dominance rule might apply where a short
term requirements contract is the "appropriate unit of sale" 35 in
the industry-that is, where requirements contracts are the prevailing mode of sale and where, in view of the line of commerce and
the market structure, such a manner of dealing is appropriate or
necessary. An exception of this kind could be asserted with some
force on behalf of utility companies, for example, since their
private necessities in this regard are reinforced by a public duty.
Regardless of the appropriateness of requirements contracts for
the industry concerned, the duration of the contract should be
considered for its effect upon the substantiality of the foreclosure,
since the shorter the term of the contract, the less obvious are its
detrimental effects upon competition.36
Similarly, dominance should be controlling only when related to the relevant line of commerce. If Standard Oil, for
example, had contracted exclusively with regard to an accessory
over which another supplier maintained a virtual monopoly, competition might thereby have been promoted rather than suppressed. In such a case it would be unrealistic to say that Standard's market power over gasoline sales automatically narrowed the
standard of proof required to show a lessening of competition in
the relevant market for the accessory.37
In short, "dominance" must not become an epithet ·with which
to condemn exclusive dealing arrangements as though they existed
in vacuo. To be legally operative, dominance must relate to
effective competition in a relevant consuming market, in a relevant
market area, for the appropriate line of commerce. Its effects may
KAYsEN &: TURNER, op. cit. supra note 13, at 147, 160.
the effect that requirements contracts limited to a duration of one year need
not be unreasonable restraints of trade or unfair methods of competition, see FTC v.
Motion Picture Advertising Serv. Co., 344 U.S. 392, 396 (1953); United States v. Linde Air
Prods. Co., 83 F. Supp. 978, 982 (N.D. Ill. 1949) (dictum); United States v. American Can
Co., 87 F. Supp. 18 (N.D. Del. 1949) (dictum).
37 See Excelsior Motor Mfg. &: Supply Co. v. Sound Equip., Inc., 73 F.2d 725 (7th Cir.
1934), cert. denied, 294 U.S. 706 (1935). There the supplier's exclusive dealing arrangement would have operated in a market over which a competitor exercised monopoly power.
The court noted that the effect of the arrangement would have been to introduce, rather
than lessen, competition.
35 See
30 To
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vary with the pattern of competition, the duration of the contract,
public interest, and the substantiality of the denial of market access
to competitors.
Finally, it should be noted that although the scope of market
analysis is certain to be affected by the nature of the standard of
proof applied in a given case, the concepts are not so intimately
related as to be completely interdependent. Thus while the
actual effects of a dominant supplier's exclusive contracts need not
be proved, evidence thereof will often be pertinent to such important issues as "relevant market" and "substantiality of foreclosure." In this regard, the impact of Tampa Electric upon the
lower federal courts is likely to be considerable. By restricting
the quantitative substantiality doctrine to tying contract cases and
by limiting the applicability of the Standard Stations opinion, the
Court has practically insured, and properly so, the future utilization of a more extensive factual inquiry than the courts have lately
exhibited a willingness to undertake.

IV.
The probable impact of Tampa Electric upon the Federal
Trade Commission's approach to exclusive dealing is more difficult
to predict. At one time, this approach was characterized by an
emphasis, in contested cases, upon the necessity for shO"wing an
actual or probable lessening of competition beyond considerations
of market power and quantitative substantiality.
For example, in Maico Co.,38 a case involving a manufacturer
of hearing aid instruments and other products, the examiner
found a violation on the basis of respondent's rank in the field, its
volume of business, and the number of exclusive contracts it had
with distributors. He rejected evidence introduced by respondent
to show an increase in competition, a decrease in its 01vn share of
the market, the small percentage of dealers it actually had under
contract, and other matters of like import. The Commission, believing these unconsidered factors bore materially on the question
whether there was or might be a substantial lessening of competition, remanded the matter to the examiner "for the development
of a record sufficient to enable us to determine the effect of
respondent's practices on competition." 39
ss 50 F.T.C. 485 (1953).
39 Id. at 488. See also Revlon Prods. Corp., 51 F.T.C. 260, 276 (1954) (FTC declines
to restrict its consideration to quantitative substantiality). Compare the Commission's
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Until recently, FTC approval of a less inclusive standard of
proof has been virtually nonexistent, although this is perhaps due
to the fact that actual exclusion of competitors has usually been
affirmatively demonstrated even in those cases where a more
restricted inquiry would have sufficed to prove a violation.40
In two such cases, Dictograph Prods., Inc.41 and Anchor Serum
Co.,42 affirmance by the reviewing courts was couched in language
expressing approval of a narrower approach. This did not accord
with the Commission's position, judging from the view expressed
in Maico that the FTC, because of its expertise, should consider
evidence of actual effect on competition even though it understood Mr. Justice Frankfurter in Standard Stations to have found
courts ill-equipped for the task.43
In so indicating that it might require a greater showing of
anticompetitive market effects even where dominance and other
restrictive factors would, in a federal court, relieve the Government of that burden, the Commission assumed a position inconsistent with the idea that the evidentiary criteria of illegality in
section 3 cases should not vary with the tribunal involved.44 Dual
enforcement of the statute need not, and should not, dictate dual
standards of legality.
More recently, however, the Commission has retreated from
its Maico stand to a position substantially in harmony with Tampa
Electric's view of Standard Stations and related cases. In Mytinger
& Casselberry, Inc.,45 where the Commission held illegal respondent's exclusive dealing contracts ·with 80,700 distributors of its
vitamin and mineral supplements, covering from 8.6 percent to
61.52 percent of three relevant markets, the Commission observed:
approach to tying cases in Insto-Gas Corp., 51 F.T.C. 363 (1954). Cf. Pillsbury Mills,
50 F.T.C. 555 (1954) (under § 7 of the Clayton Act).
Harley-Davidson Motor Co., 50 F.T.C. 1047, 1066 (1954).
4150 F.T.C. 281 (1953), afj'd, 217 F.2d 821 (2d Cir. 1954).
42 50 F.T.C. 681, afj'd, 217 F.2d 867 (7th Cir. 1954).
43 50 F.T.C. at 488. This view somewhat overgeneralizes the Justice's opinion which
should have been read in the light of the evidence offered by Standard in that case and
the particular pattern of competition involved there. See note 20 supra. But see An'Y
GEN. NAT'L CoMM. ANTITRUST REP. 148 n.77 (1955): "We do not read the Federal Trade
Commission's opinion in the Maico case • • • as launching that agency into economic
investigations beyond the inquiry authorized by the governing interpretations of Section 3
that bind courts and the Commission alike."
44 See Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 310 n.13 (1949); An'Y GEN.
NAT'L CoMM. ANTITRUST REP. 148 (1955).
45 F.T.C. Docket 6962, September 28, 1960.
40 E.g.,
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"Respondents introduced certain economic data as justification for the use of their exclusive dealing arrangements.
It is true ... that in the Maico case, the Commission issued an
order remanding the matter to the hearing examiner for the
purpose of obtaining evidence as to the economic effect of the
exclusive dealing agreements used by that company.... However, since the date of the Commission's action in the Maico
case, the courts have made it clear that in a situation such as
that shown to exist in this record, the plain language of Section 3 makes irrelevant those economic considerations urged
by respondents."46
Similarly, in Timken Roller Bearing Co.,47 the Commission
struck down respondent's exclusive dealing contracts covering over
7,500 marketing outlets for the sale of tapered roller bearings in
the replacement market for that product. A probable substantial
lessening of competition was held to be fully established, in the
light of Standard Stations, Dictograph and Anchor Serum, by
evidence demonstrating that respondent was by far the leading
supplier in the replacement market:4 8 and that its exclusive dealing
contracts affected a substantial share of the market.
In narrowing the scope of required market inquiry, the Commission has not only recognized that the validity of such an approach
is not restricted to the courts, but also it has gone farther and applied the criteria invoked in Standard Stations to situations involving market leadership unaccompanied by other important
indicia of dominant power. Whether the Supreme Court would
be willing to go so far is doubtful in view of the limitations the
Court has already placed upon the applicability o,f the more
quantitative test. It is by no means obvious that market leadership, without more, is sufficient to establish a clear probability that
competition will be substantially lessened by the leader's extensive
use of exclusive dealing contracts. Therefore, a closer look at
market effects would appear to be warranted.
CONCLUSION

The primary effect of the Tampa Electric opinion is likely to
be a greater emphasis, by the courts and perhaps by the Federal
46Jd. at 3.
47 F.T.C. Docket 6504, January
48 Timken's dollar volume was

24, 1961.
roughly ten times that of its nearest competitor; it had
over fourteen times the number of different items in its roller bearing line; and it had
almost four times as many customers. Id. at 14-15.
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Trade Commission, upon qualitative factors in section 3 exclusive
dealing cases involving non-dominant suppliers. At the same
time, Standard Stations has been paired with the dominant-supplier cases in such a manner as to reaffirm the applicability of a
less searching, although not entirely quantitative, standard of
proof where the existence of special market power and certain
other structural and behavioral circumstances increases-to an as
yet not clearly-defined degree-the probability of anticompetitive
consequences.
While Tampa Electric does not remove all obstacles to understanding, it would be unreasonable to expect the Court to employ
a relatively clear-cut case as a vehicle for the anticipatory resolution of every marginal issue likely to arise in this area of "not insubstantial" complexity. The antitrust aspects of exclusive dealing are significantly illuminated by what the opinion does say and
its shortcomings as a definitive work should not render it less
welcome.
Judd L. Bacon, S. Ed.

